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THREE MODELS OF SCIENCE IN THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*
RICHARD B. FINNEGAN**
In the space of 176 years the Lower Mississippi has shortened itself 242 miles. That is an average of a trifle over one mile
and a third per year. Therefore, any ordinary person who is not
blind or idiotic can see that just a million years ago next November, the Lower Mississippi River was upward of one million
three hundred miles long, and stuck out over the Gulf of Mexico
like a fishing rod. And by the same token any person can see that
742 years from now the Lower Mississippi will be only a mile
and three-quarters long .

.

. There is something fascinating

about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out
of such a trifling investment in fact.'
Twain's tweaking of science is not inconsistent with the responses that science provokes among scholars and laymen alike.
Among social science scholars, the preference for scientific approaches is likely to generate heated arguments as to the nature of
one's subject matter, the hardness of results, the chimera of the natural sciences, and endless restatements of Aristotole's dictum about
using the amount of scientific precision appropriate to the subject
matter. Such controversies often generate more hostility than insight because scholars fail to communicate with one another and
instead resort to "brilliant" arguments and clever putdowns. By the
use of such words as science, theory, method, and data within the
context of their location in the discipline's matrix, the words become elastic and undefined for debate purposes. For those who
share similar perspectives, the terms have clear meaning. Thus, arguments used in defense of their position seem coherent and com* The empirical approach to the study of international law advocated by the author
in Model III is supported by research in international relations theory of special interest: the
World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) conducted by Professor Charles McClelland of the
University of Southern California; the Conflict and Peace Data Bank of Professor Edward
Azar of the University of North Carolina; and, the Transnational Rules Indicators Project
(TRIP) conducted by Professor Charles Kegley of the University of South Carolina.
** Director, International Studies Program, Stonehill College; Ph.D., 1971, Florida
State University; A.M., 1966, Boston College; A.B., 1964, Stonehill College.
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pelling, but among those sharing a different definitional base the
arguments emerge as incoherent and unconvincing.
The above discussion provides a preface to discussing such
terms when studying international law. Over the past decade, debates among international law scholars have raged over the questions of a science of international law, the relationship of
international law to the social sciences, the development of theory,
the appropriateness of new methods, the generation of new data,
and the correct approach to our subject. This article is an attempt to
bring order to the welter of perspectives and argumentation regarding approaches to the study of international law. Attempts to clarify
and reformulate necessitate the restatement of familar theories and
arguments which may be an unfortunate bit of redundancy to
scholars of international law, but which are, nevertheless, necessary
to articulate the basic thesis of this article.
The basic thesis is that there are three clear and distinct models
of science operative within the study of international law. Within
each model, the definition of science stresses different conceptual
orders, such as assumptions, perspectives, and definitions of the
field, as well as different methods of analysis, such as definition,
collection, and manipulation of data in light of the conceptual order. By stretching the term science to include both the conceptual
order and methods of analysis, the term becomes the equivalent to
Thomas Kuhn's use of the word "paradigm" in the physical sciences. Kuhn defined paradigm as an inclusive orientation to science
including basic theory, application, instrumentation, and an open
ended set of puzzles capable of solution by those working within
the paradigm. 2 Kuhn later reformulated his conception to include
the impact of culture, education, and the scientist's world view.
Such a demanding, cohesive, and inclusive image of the work of
scientists is probably inappropriate to the social sciences.
Kuhn, in fact, states that "it remains an open question what
parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all."'3
Nevertheless, we can categorize the preparadigmatic conceptual orders and methods under the rubric paradigm because such a term
allows the inclusive clustering of similar scholarly viewpoints without the need to articulate endless distinctions.
In the following sections, the models of science or paradigms
are presented and followed by an assessment of their strengths and
2. T. KUHN,
3. Id. at 15.
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weaknesses. As we move from Model One to Model Three, a dialectical order is posited and the perceived weaknesses of prior models provide the premise for the generation of new paradigms.
Science definitions shall display an increasing order of rigor in
what is meant by the term science. This does not mean that previous models disappear as we move along the continuum. On the
contrary, in each case, the paradigm's particular strengths insure its
continuance as an intellectual harbor for scholars of international
law.
I.

MODEL ONE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A BODY OF

KNOWLEDGE POSSESSED AS A RESULT OF STUDY OR
PRACTICE

A.

Conceptual Order andModel One

The basic assumptions of the Model One approach to international law are: 1) the existence of a world society; 2) the world society is ruled by law operating as a constraint on national behavior;
3) the law can be stipulated and constitutes an integrated body of
principles; and 4) the key doctrine is "consent" which undergirds
the regime of norms or rules.
By taking each assumption in turn, we can examine them in
more detail. Quincy Wright spells out the basic perspectives:
b)

International law assumes a) there is a world society ....
. . this society [is] divided into major groups whose interests

are sometimes consistent and sometimes inconsistent, c) that
each group guided by reason perceives that its interests will be
best served if all observe rules of law . . . , d) that the world
society ... will generally prevent flagrant violations of the law
from succeeding. 4

The notion of society is rooted in the one conception of international law which focused on the nature of the European historical community and the philosophy of law which emerged from that
community. The concept of community or society was rooted in the
historical reality of a European family of nations which shared religious, philosophical, and cultural heritage in addition to Roman
Law. Europe was more than a collection of highly fragmented
states. The commanding intellectual position of natural law, which
stressed the transcendental and encompassing nature of interna4. Q.
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tional law, reinforced the notion of community in the particular
historical experience of Europe.
The society of nations is ruled by law, and, thus, state behavior
is interpreted in light of this assumption. The chief characteristic of
the law is its controlling quality. William Coplin states that:
Most writers on international relations and international

law still examine the relationship between international law and
politics in terms of the assumption that law either should5 or does
function only as a coercive restraint on political action.
Pursuant to this view, law is seen mainly in its capacity to bind
nations to specific behavior. The focus is on obedience and the
grounds necessary to impose sanctions.
The stress on the nature of a community of sovereign equals
brought about a focus on the critical concept of consent. When sovereign equals consent, law is created. This follows deductively from
the concept of sovereign equality. The same result can be reached
through inductive reasoning as well because the historical record of
nations has been characterized by a zealous preservation of their
perogatives to decide their goals and the means to achieve them.
The most visible manifestation of consent can be found in treaties
and, therefore, treaties are the principle corpus of international law.
States also adhere to regular patterns of behavior known as customs, which in legal and governmental decisions have been treated
as law. The doctrine of consent, with respect to custom, assumes
that states are obligated by law in their participation in international society. Therefore, their consent to custom is implicit.
The doctrine of consent among sovereign nations produces an
existing body of law which provides material for the study of international law. William Tung's definition represents many other definitions which are similar in this approach. He states that
"[i]nternational law is a body of principles and rules commonly observed by members of the international' '6 community in their dealing
with one another and their nationals.
The focus of legal analysis, then, is on actual laws constraining
behavior among members of the international community. The
study of formal laws need not be restricted to the present; a historical, regional, or topical focus may be stressed. The concern is the
5. Coplin, InternationalLaw and Assumptions About the State System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 15 (R. Falk & W. Hanrieder eds. 1968).
6. W. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD 1 (1968).
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identification of laws, the emergence of laws, the application of
laws, and the violation of laws.
Variations among scholars in this conceptual order regarding
the jurisprudential base for international law should not detract
from the consensus surrounding the above assumptions. Corbett
expressed the consensus on assumptions when he stated:
It has been assumed in the literature of the subject that order in the relation of States . . .is a matter of law. The law believed necessary is a body of rules. . . in accordance with which
all questions concerning the rights and duties of States vis-1-vis
other States should be answered, all disputes turning on rights
and duties settled, and all the conduct of governments in international matters governed. The treatises and text books are almost
wholly concerned with the discovery, statement, and documentation of these rules.7
The key feature of the entire conceptional order is that the
stress on legal variables is dominant, while the stress on political
and other variables is either dependent or inconsequential. In fact,
national political decisions have played a relatively small role in
the analysis of international law. Tom Farer notes that "[ajs a
group [the scholars in Model One] have not evinced a deep interest
in the behavioral mechanisms by means of which their perceived
regime of rules has affected or governed the ultimate act of political
decision." '
B.

Methods of Analysis and Model One

Turning to methods of analysis, we can now attempt to specify
the analytic techniques utilized by this paradigm. The principal
method of analysis is the examination of legal materials in a search
for links, divergences, and similarities. This is followed by synthesizing such materials into a perspective on the nature, source, application, or violation of international norms. Emphasis is on the
description and logical analysis of legal implications. Falk called
this method "impressionism" and although his view is critical, his
description is apt.
Legal analysis is based upon a partial selection of relevant
material in which the criteria for selection are arbitary reflections
of the researcher's values, national locus, and imperfect factual
knowledge.
7. P. CORBETT, THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (1955).
8. Farer, InternationalLaw and PoliticalBehavior, 25 WORLD POL. 432 (1973).
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Research has been concentrated on the analysis of legal issues in problem areas or in the presentation or more or less exhaustive informational surveys that collect the experience of the
past. 9
Data, in this area, means primary and secondary legal source
materials such as cases, treatises, constitutions, resolutions, and actions of international organizations. These data are combined in a
contemporary and/or historical perspective to amplify a legal, philosophical, or historical point. The method and data are "scientific"
because they can be characterized as objective and exhaustive according to the terms of the canons of good legal scholarship.
C.W. Jenks extends the dimensions of analytical methods in
this paradigm when he establishes two standards for the study of
international law; scholarship and practice. The international law
student's contribution must aim for the creation of an ordered
world where legal patterns prevail.
Although the legal scholar must contribute to the substantive
analysis of law, Jenks further adds that there is a need for practical
skills as well, because scholarship alone cannot create a workable
body of law. The combination of scholarship and practical skills is
called "craftsmanship." A craftsman is trained to meet the tasks of
legal advisor, legislative draftsman, advocate, arbiter, and judge.
Both standards of scholarship and practice are concerned with
shaping, coloring, and judging international law within the context
of international legal practice.
The craftsman's training reflects the classical tradition in
scholarship that stresses history, philosophy, and law. Jenks suggests that international lawyers be schooled in legal history, jurisprudence, various branches of law, comparative law (French,
German, Italian, Dutch, Swiss, Roman, Scandinavian, Spanish,
Latin American, Russian, Islamic, Chinese, Asian, and African), at
least two foreign languages, the texts and treatises on international
law, history, political science, and economics.'" Jenks' rather strenuous demand is modeled on the type of scholar who writes major
treatises, advises governments and serves on international tribunals
in the manner of Phillip Jessup.
9. Falk, New Approaches to InternationalLaw, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNA369 (M. Kaplan ed. 1968).
10. Jenks, Craftsmanshipin InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 78-90 (L. Grass ed. 1969).
TIONAL RELATIONS
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The combination of the conceptual order and methods of analysis in this paradigm creates a model of science characterized by
substantive content manipulation of that content, and logical analysis. Consistent with the first definition of science, Model One
stresses a body of knowledge acquired through study and practice.
Charles Fenwick describes the "science" of this paradigm by
stating that "[t]he term "science" as applied to international law
may be taken in the sense of a systematic classification of the principles and rules of international law accompanied by an analysis of
their origin and nature and their place in the general field of judicial relations."' I
C

Strengths of the Model One Approach

This paradigm of legal studies has been criticized sharply;
these criticisms move the discussion logically to Model Two. However, the strengths of Model One should first be noted. This paradigm meets high standards of scholarship regarding the two
important concepts of science and theory, albeit those standards are
within the definitions promulgated by scholars in the field.
The study of international law under this paradigm generates
and critically analyzes a substantive body of law. Law is a normative phenomena in human affairs and integration of that body of
law creates a normative theory of international behavior. Theory,
as used here, means a logically integrated body of normative propositions. The archtypical scholar of this approach is Hans
Kelsen,1 2 who presents a body of integrated principles of international law. Kelsen is concerned with the jurisprudential derivation
of norms, the consistency of norms with law as generating patterns,
and the deductive integration of norms with each other. In this respect international legal analysis is scientific. Falk, indicating the
value of this perspective, notes:
It is Kelsen's view that the role of the international lawyer is
to present the normative phenomena--the norms that qualify as
law by the law creating rules of the system- in an analytically
coherent fashion thereby depicting what the law is. Such a pres-

entation is scientific as it is guided by objective canons of schol-3
arship and avoids the pitfalls of conjecture or wishful thinking.'
11. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1965).
12.

H. KELSON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952).

13. Falk, supra note 9, at 135.
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Flowing from a scientific and normative theory are the criteria for
what is legal and what is illegal. The analytic approach is capable
of indicating what the law is as well as what the law is not. This
obvious and seemingly modest strength of Kelsen's jurisprudence is
important and should be noted in light of the different legal perspectives considered infra in Model Two. When discussing the analytic approach, Josef Kunz notes simply that "[t]he analytic
approach will always be indispensable in order to know the present
law systematically; that will always be the first task of the science of
law." 14
Another strength of the Model One paradigm is premised,
once again, on practice and craftsmanship. Robert Kharasch,
speaking of lawyers, noted that "[tihey draft wordy documents, file
pleadings, try cases, and generally engage in those lawyer-like activities so properly condemned by nonlawyers until the nonlawyers
need help." I5 If a person needed help regarding a thorny legal problem involving international law, they would do well to seek out a
skilled international lawyer who knows the relevant law and state
practice, and who can take the legal actions necessary. A political
scientist or sociologist working on the legal aspects of government
policy would be of little help.
D. Weaknesses of the Model One Approach
The strengths of the Model One paradigm are insufficient to
command the allegiance of all legal scholars, and, in the past two
decades, a body of criticism has accumulated which can be reviewed and summarized. The encapsulated realm of a legal analysis characterized not only by increasing specialization, but also by
peer approval of that specialization, began to be seen as increasingly irrelevant in a world dominated by a multiplicity of new pat14. Kunz, The Changing Science of InternationalLaw, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 488, 494
(1962). Another strength in the Model One paradigm concerns policy advice. There is a wide
variety of examples in various private and public arenas. Under the category of Treaties in
OCEANA PUBLICATION'S, A GUIDE TO A BASIC COLLECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

RELATIONS (1974) one can find Blix & Emerson, The Treaty Maker's Handbook; under the
category of State Practice, Deak, American InternationalLaw Cases; under the category of
Judicial Decisions, Jenks, The Prospects of InternationalAdjiudicationr,under the category of
International Organizations, Garcia-Amador, Recent Codificationof the Law ofState Responsibilityfor Injury to Aliens; under the category of International Commercial Law, Delaume,
TransnationalContracts:.Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes.These represent a mere
fragment of the concrete collection of legal materials and analytic treatments which guide the
citizen, lawyer, businessman, diplomat, and bureaucrat through the welter of political and
functional international transactions.
15. R. KHARASCH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPRERATIVE 3 (1973).
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terns and policies. Though a defender of the Model One approach,
Josef Kunz aptly summarized the changes in international law and
noted:
Corresponding to this changing law of nations, of course, is
a changing science of international law. It reflects this crisis, all
the progressions and retrogressions of international law, all its
hopes and disillusion, all its contradictions, its uncertainty, inadequacy, its often experimental and sometimes ephemeral character. It is the science of international law in a period of transition
from the "classic" law of nations, which is definitely gone to
some "new" international law which has not yet arrived .... "
The challenges to Model One come from the revival of the naturalists, which is actually a brief and weak challenge, and from the
political realists such as Morgenthau and Kennan, who saw international law as impotent when expected to control the conflicts of
national interests. The most important challenges, however, come
from the legal realists, or the sociological school of jurisprudence.
This sociological challenge has had the greatest impact because it
emanated from the field of international legal studies, and yet, drew
on extrinsic criticisms of the Model One paradigm, such as those
from the political realists.
The basic weakness of Model One legal scholarship is that it is
irrelevant. This irrelevance is due to a detachment from reality,
from policy, and from the impact of social variables on law. The
result is a weak theory as a consequence of over-specialization. The
irrelevance of Model One analysis can be indicated by a brief look
at the list of prominent scholars convened by the American Academy of Political and Social Science to discuss international relations research; its scope, theory, methods, and relevance. 7 Of the
eighteen scholars present, not one was a specialist in international
law; furthermore, a survey by specialists in international relations
revealed that international law was perceived by the respondents to
be a subfield where the least significant research was produced. Respondents from all subfields, except international law, concurred.
This agreement was apparent among scholars of different ages and
different methodological preferences.'"
16. Kunz, supra note 14, at 488.
17. N. PALMER, A DESIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH: SCOPE, THEORY, METHODS AND RELEVANCE vi (1970). In 307 pages, the topic of international law was
rarely mentioned.
18. Finnegan, InternationalfRelations.'A Viewfrom Within, 7 TOWSON ST. J. INT'L AFF.
1,3 (1972).
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Corbett and Stanley Hoffmann stress the reaction of other social scientists when they confront Model One legal analysis.
Hoffmann suggests that the reason social scientists do not study international law is because they are impatient with an approach that
emphasizes "a closed system of norms-their logical consequences,
their hierarchy, their interconnections--divorced from the political
and social universe .. ."I' In 1955, Corbett stated that "[w]hen
historians and political scientists began to take an active part in the
analysis of contemporary international affairs, they were immediately struck by the remoteness of this juristic world from the conduct of governments." 2
Richard Falk sees detachment from reality in the Model One
approach because it is based on the historical development of the
nation-state after Westphalia, which includes the premises of an
ethical unity of all mankind, a small number of national actors, the
prevalence of the natural law perspective, the assumption of sovereign equality, and reciprocity among national actors. He suggests
that the changes in world politics, including the multiplication of
actors, cultural diversity, ideological conflict, regional, and supranational actors, and the minimum relationship between legal norms
and national behavior, compel scholars to seek a new conceptual
base from which to analyze international law.2" Yet, the detachment from reality in the Model One paradigm is more than a simple attachment to the Westphalia model. Falk saw Model One
rooted not only in an inaccurate image of the world of nations, but
also in an inaccurate parallelism between the domestic legislative,
executive, and judicial organs and their international counterparts.
This view resulted in an over-exaggeration of the impact of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations accompanied
by either an artifical enthusiasm or a premature despair.22 Their detachment from governmental decisions and their legal analysis,
which had such a minimal impact, placed Model One scholars in
an irrelevant position outside of policy. Falk suggests that they "detached law from the political context of world affairs and made
".

19. Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International
Relations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 150 (L. Gross ed. 1969).
20. CORBETT, supra note 7, at 47.
21. Falk, The Developing or Organizing Conceptsfor Contemporary InternationalLegal
Perspectives, in THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER II 90 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds.
1966); Falk, supra note 9, at 357-58.
22. Falk, supra note 9, at 362.
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Wesley
rigid analyses of the regulation of state conduct .
Gould and Micheal Barkun noted the detachment of Model One
scholars from the impact of the social setting of law and policy.
They seek a new orientation toward international law, but suggest
that for international law to be adequately understood
"[s]ociological, political, economic and other social science data
must be combined with the legal. Lack of such combinations in
most textbooks,. . is the inadequacy that the social scientist finds
24
in legal writings .
*."..",

The critics stat6 that the three weaknesses noted above stem
from deficiencies in the theory and methods of Model One. Falk
contends that the mind set of Model One scholars is hostile to theory because:
Most international lawyers. . . profess to be antitheoretical.
Such a profession is often accompanied, or even justified, by a
conviction that theory is a waste of time in legal studies. The
serious work of legal research, the argument proceeds, is to organize and analyze the knowledge that has grown up as a consequence of attempts by lawyers, judges, government officials, and
other scholars to solve specific legal problems.25
Falk, however, notes that to be antitheoretical is to be connected
with an implicit or unarticulated theory, which is an uncertain
guide to knowledge:
To refuse to reexamine the theoretical base of inquiry into
the international legal order is to be reconciled to an old theory
rather than be rid of theory altogether. The difference between
the antitheorist and the theorist is that the former is the servant
of implicit theory, whereas the theorist, if competent, is the
master of an explicit theory that he refines as an instrument suitable whatever substantive study he proposes to undertake.26
Thus, the Model One scholar is operating out a theory which is
implicit to some degree, and tied to a particular historical period in
the development of the international system. Such theory is unrelated to what goes on among decision makers. Barkun states that
"the past theoretical approaches to the legal profession have involved logical manipulation of a legal corpus more often than the
23.

Id. at 361.

24. W.

GOULD &

M.

BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 64

(1970).

25. R.
26.

FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 8 (1970).

Id. at 9.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978

11

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1978], Art. 8
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

empirical study of patterns of human behavior." 27
Myres McDougal adds two basic criticisms of the Model One
theory. First, the theory is a prisoner of the past because "[i]t confuses reference to probable future decisions with reference to past
decisions. 28 Past decisions, according to McDougal, are confused
with the preference for future decision, and with the scientific study
of decision variables. The most important weakness of the Model
One theory, however, is that one variable--consent-is relied upon
to explain the whole legal process.29
Two criteria--explanation and prediction-were applied to
Model One by Corbett and he found little evidence of either:
It was apparent that law offered no explanation of the actions of governments and no basis for predicting their actions. It
was neither, in other words, an aid to comprehension nor a
measure of expectations by which to3 0guide policy. The study of
international law fell into disrepute.
According to Falk, the impressionistic methods discussed above
flow from the reliance placed upon implicit theory. He states that
"[t]he traditional avoidance of theoretical issues is most pronounced in legal thinking which has tended to adopt a method of
descriptive analytic research .... -31 Furthermore, the normative
quality in the Model One legal theory has led some political analysts to conclude that:
The methodology of this approach reflected strong normative overtones . . . . Moreover the effort was guided by a
broad set of underlying assumptions especially on optimism concerning the development of international relations in a particular
direction. Only an absence of conscious concern with methodology . . . can explain this awkward but well intentioned approach.32
The "conscious concern" for methodology is actually a code phrase
for the adoption of explicit techniques regarding data gathering
and manipulation, as well as the treatment of source material in a
27. M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 3 (1968).
28. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: .4 Policy
Oriented Framework ofInquiry, in THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 11 117 (R. Falk & S.

Mendlovitz eds. 1966).
29. Id.

30. CORBETT, supra note 7, at 47.
31. FALK, supra note 25, at 38.
32. R. GOLEMBIEWSKI, W. WELSH & W. CROTTY, A METHOLODOGICAL PRIMER FOR

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 322 (1969).
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more systematic fashion. Ahmad Sheikh offers a blanket indictment of classical methods when he states that:
The classical writers of international law have developed
over the years convenient frameworks and methods of their own.
If for the moment we lump the old methods together, we shall
find them in fundamental opposition to the viewpoint of the social sciences . . . . Although we have heard a great deal about
jurisprudence being the "science of law" it really always has
been insulated from the scientific methods.33
While the Model One theory may be sufficient to satisfy those
scholars who share the assumptions of the paradigm, it comes in for
harsh criticism from those who seek new conceptual approaches.
The methods of the paradigm may be sufficient for the adherents,
but not for the critics. Something new was needed and a new approach to international legal studies emerged, which is the Model
Two paradigm.
II.

MODEL

Two:

INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A BRANCH OF

SYSTEMATIZED KNOWLEDGE CONSIDERED AS A

DISTINCT FIELD OF INVESTIGATION OR
OBJECT OF STUDY

The criticisms of the Model One approach to the study of international law revealed the need for a new paradigm. Keeping the
criticisms of the Model One approach in mind, the Model Two
scholars stressed a relocation of the field closer to or within the social sciences, as well as new sociological approaches to the subject.
They further emphasized new theory and methods. Falk noted the
need to move closer to social science when he stated that "[llegal
science, as other social sciences, depends for progress at this stage
of its development upon gradually replacing the traditions of undisciplined speculation with increasingly rigorous methods of analysis
and observation." 34 The search for new conceptual frameworks
broke free of the Model One assumptions and demanded not only
spatial and temporal inclusiveness, but also the freedom to explore
the role of law in a dynamic setting. Gould and Barkun specify the
needed purview:
What is needed is a concept that would do the following:
establish a minimum requirement for the presence of law; ac33. A.

SHEIKH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL BEHAVIOR 8

(1974). This indis-

criminate lumping is, incidentally, a poor start toward the clarity of categorization to which
Sheikh aspires.
34. FALK, supra note 25, at 40.
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count for the actual relationships of states and international organizations; permit the holding of something in common without
imposing the standards of community or of society which we apply when individuals and groups less comprehensive than the
state associate; carry no necessary global implications; and be
valid for the period of the separation of Europe from the Americas, southern Africa, the Far East, and Southeast Asia, as well as
for the relationships inaugurated by the Age of Discovery. This
means that a concept is needed that would permit progressive
developments from the simple to the complex, from the local to
the global . . . and from the unifunctional to the multifunctional.3 5
The closed system of Model One's normative legal theory had to be
replaced by a realistic and dynamic theory. The most elaborate of
the newer approaches is that of McDougal who, in 1960, specified
the type of theory needed for international legal studies:
A theory of adequate explicitness, comprehensiveness and
realism about international law, by calling attention to relevant
variables in context and indicating necessary intellectual procedures, might thus, in more particular be expected to aid in the
rational classification of general community and individual
goals; to bring a necessary stability in reference to the organization of information about past trends in decisions; to promote a
useful comparison through time and across boundaries of the
factors that appear to have affected past decisions; to stimulate
the consideration of possible and probable future developments;
and to foster the invention and recommendation of more effective alternatives for the achievement of clarified goals.3 6

The search for new approaches and theory is complimented by the
search for new methods. Falk, Gould, and Barkun call for improved methods for the purpose of enriching theory.
Improved methodology, too, should be part of an endeavor
to advance international legal theory beyond heuristics. 37 Resort
to 'social science methods for the investigation of legal phenomena and bridge topics signifies not just an undertaking to improve methodology but also a stressing for richer conceptual
schemes and the unification of theorists' thinking beyond what
formal theories of law and formal theories of politics permit.38
35.

GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24, at 53.

36. McDougal, supra note 28.
37. FALK, supra note 25, at 40.
38.

GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24, at 23.
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Conceptual Order and Model Two

The clamor for new approaches, theory, and method, as well
as the creation of a new conceptual order, is based, implicitly and
explicitly, on a series of underlying assumptions. These assumptions can be stated as follows: 1) political variables are often independent and controlling, while legal variables are dependent; 2)
international law is predominantly a body of law emerging out of
behavior, and not solely a law for restraining behavior; 3) the subject matter of international law is the interface between politics and
law, and; 4) the linkage of international law to the international
system, or to the decisions of policy makers, must be made explicit
through analytic models.
Taking each assumption in detail, Corbett flatly states that
"[diecision makers in the international field. . . do not, in spite of
their oratorical invocations of law, operate for the most important
purposes in obedience to notions of legal compulsion." 3 9 Legal analysts felt that this fact must be placed in theoretical priority. The
analysts recognize that in a fragmented world, characterized by revolutionary transformations, law is not controlling; rather it is a
product of the political process. Hoffmann states this point both accurately and dramatically:
The nature of the internationalsystem condemns international
law to all the weaknesses and perversions that it is so easy to
deride. International law is merely a magnifying mirror that reflects faithfully and cruelly the essence and logic of international
politics. In a fragmented world there is no "global perspective"
from which anyone can authoritatively assess, endorse, or reject
the separate national efforts at making international law serve
national interests above all. Like the somber universe of Albert
Caligula, this is a judgeless world where no one is innoCamus'
4
cent. 0
While attempting to indicate that law has controlling influence and
simultaneously is a product of the political international system,
Falk refers to international law as a "quasi-dependent variable." It
is dependent because, although it is shaped by the international system, it also "may serve as a strategy by which to participate in or
39. CORBETT, supra note 7, at 52.
40. Hoffmann, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS xvii (L.

Scheinman & D. Wilkinson eds. 1968) (emphasis added); Hoffmann, InternationalSystems
and International Law, in THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER II 140 (R. Falk & S.
Mendlovitz eds. 1966).
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transform the international system. 4 1
The second assumption is the focus on international law as a
law emerging out of behavior rather than/or behavior. This viewpoint leads to redefining international legal study apart from the
Model One body of law. The law of behavior stresses tacit and explicit norms as generated between nations or blocs. This behavioral
approach does not stress formal law. Deutsch states that
"[i]nternational law is first and foremost a law of behavior, it is a
law for behavior only indirectly and [at] a distance. '42 He further
indicates that deterrence is a rudimentary coordination of behavior
which could lead to "overt and tacit" conventions and "new customary international or quasi-law."4' 3 Falk, however, questions
whether such tacit or informal norms will be studied alongside
those norms generated by formal law and argues that his viewpoint
should be adopted.
Effective restraints on the behavior of sovereign states may
be introduced into international behavior by tacit means in certain situations. Such restraints could never have been agreed
upon by formal negotiations. It is important to understand the
relationship between formal and informal norms . . . . Part of
this understanding can be achieved by the adoption of a conception of law that is broad enough to include horizontal as well as
vertical forms of legal order."
The third assumption is that the study of international law
must shift from the study of a body of law to the political, social,
and economic contexts of behavior, where law is merely operative.
Ahmad Sheikh calls for a conceptual framework in international
legal studies which would
allow us to concentrate on the interaction of the law-politics
processes, with the expectation of learning systematically the
law's influences in the modification of state behavior and the
state's attempt to redefine existing international legal norms, to
make new laws and discard old ones, and most importantly, to
either observe international law, ignore it, or violate it in specific
instances.4 5
4 1. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and CharterConceptions ofthe InternationalLegal
Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 35 (R. Falk & C. Black eds.

1969).
42. Deutsch, The Probability of InternationalLaw, in
NATIONAL LAW 73 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968).

THE RELEVANCE OF INTER-

43. Id.
44. FALK, supra note 25, at 37.
45. SHEIKH, supra note 33, at 9.
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The fourth assumption is that the linkages of international law
to the environment in which it is operative, or to the decisions, in
which it also is operative, must be made explicit. The environments
and decisions are predominantly political as was indicated in the
initial assumption. Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach state
that:
A realistic study of law must .

see law in relation to its

institutional support, examining the larger process through
which rules are created, applied and administered. There is a difference between the institutions which accomplished this within
a domestic society and within an international community. This
makes it necessary to examine international law within its particular political context.' 6
Falk, Shiekh, and particularly McDougal adher to this assumption.
McDougal organizes his entire approach to international law
around the context of particular decisions. The use of Lasswell's
conceptual framework insures that context will be explored comprehensively and thoroughly.4 7
The demands for new approaches, theories, and methods,
within the context of the above assumptions, culminated in the development of two conceptual frameworks for the study of international law. The first and more elaborate of the two is McDougal's
"policy analysis" approach. The second could be termed a "systems
analysis" approach, although a somewhat more varied group of approaches is included.4 8
46. Kaplan & Katzenbach, Law in the InternationalCommunity, in THE STRATEGY OF
II 22 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1966).
47. McDougal, supra note 28, at 116-33; McDougal & Lasswell, The Identifcation and
Appraisalof Diverse Systems of Public Order, in THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 45-74 (R.
Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1966).
48. Richard Falk, in discussing "new" approaches to international law, identifies three
others. The first is the functional orientation. This approach is a Model One orientation to
international law. It seeks to place stress on the international law of non-political interactions
between states rather than political interactions. Another approach is quantitative empiricism, which is concerned with new data and data manipulation. This is not an approach at
all, but rather, a stress on methods of data making and techniques of manipulation. The final
new approach identified by Falk is the phenomenological perspective, which places stress on
the analyses of single cases to discover the general attributes of legal systems. Falk attempts
to root this approach in the philosophical perspective of Edmund Husserl, but the effort is a
bit strained. The whole approach appears to be a Model Two justification for the traditional
case study. Such an approach is unquestionably useful, but is not wholly consistent with the
new approaches, theories, and methods called for in Model Two. Falk's whole classification
of new approaches is, in fact, an example of how not to go about seeking "richer conceptual
schemes." He has grouped together five perspectives, some of which are not new, with no
criteria for inclusion or exclusion and no common basis of comparison. The list includes two
WORLD ORDER
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To describe the policy analysis approach to international law
in full detail is beyond the scope of this article, and, therefore, only
the principal features will be outlined.4 9 McDougal begins by rejecting the entire theoretical and methodological framework of the
Model One paradigm. Stressing the diversity, fragmentation, and
conflict within the international order, he focuses on the national
decision maker and the process of decision. Drawing on Lasswell's
conceptual framework, he examines decisions through the lenses of
participants, perspectives, arenas, base values, strategies, outcomes,
and effects.5" The variables encompass sociocultural, economic, political, and strategic aspects, and are utilized to clarify the past experience, the present circumstances of decision, and the future
aspirations of decision makers.
Decisions are a "claim" for a specific legal position in the
world and are placed against counterclaims. The decision makers
are both claimants and judges within the international legal process. The traditional body of law is no more than an indicator of
expectation patterns and demands of other national decision makers. The decision maker does not follow those rules, because they
are "[n]ot to mechanically dictate specific decisions but to guide the
attention of decision makers to significant variable factors. .. .
The decision is a balance between national interests and the relevant community values and expectations.
Leaving aside "binding prescriptions," McDougal redefines
law as "decision sustained by effective sanction and taken in accordance with authority."52 The notion of authority is rooted in the
group member's perceptions regarding who can make those decisions that should be obeyed, and by what criteria they ought to be
obeyed. A member's perceptions of authority can vary from high
and uniform, to low and fragmented. Control is the power to effect
sanction; perceptions or expectations of control can also range from
conceptual frameworks (systems analysis and policy analysis); one focus on a substantive
area of law (functionalism); one focus on method (quantitative empiricism); and finally, a
focus on units of analysis dressed up as an approach (case studies). While this use of disparate categorization is not a terribly important point, it does indicate that "impressionism"
lingers on.
49. For an elaboration of the policy analysis approach, see generally McDougal, supra
note 28, and McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 47. See also M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES,
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

(1960). Later works by McDougal and his associates

have covered the problems of violence, the oceans, space, and treaty interpretation.
50. M. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
51. M. McDoUGAL, LAW AND WORLD MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER 57 (1960).
52. McDougal, supra note 28, at 119.
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high to low. Thus, the test of legality becomes a sliding scale on
which those decisions perceived as authoritative and capable of enforcement are more legal than those made by the decision makers
who are regarded as non-authoritative and unable to effectively
sanction their decisions.
McDougal's approach does not eschew transcendental values
when evaluating decisions. His preference is for human dignity and
freedom, where the law is seen as a policy science and lawyers are
policy scientists. The approach urges the incorporation of the social
science's theory, methods, and data into a legal analysis for the purpose of properly analyzing the context of decision. While this brief
summary does not do justice to the breadth and rigor of
McDougal's framework, it does indicate some key points.
Systems analysis is the other major approach for reconceptualizing international law in the Model Two paradigm and is an eclectic term encompassing a wide variety of theoretical assumptions
and a wide range of scientific rigor. There are three distinct meanings of systems analysis frequently used.
The first use of the term system analysis focuses on systems of
entities and draws on the intellectual heritage of Ludwig Von
Bertalanfy and his delineation of "general systems theory."5 3 Of
this particular approach Gould and Barkun noted that:
The systems approach seems to be a way of integrating various categories of data to trace patterns of consequence for the
content and effectiveness of international law. This is so even
theorists rarely adopt the terminology of internathough systems
54
tional law.
Gould and Barkun drew on the work of James G. Miller who portrays "living systems" at seven levels, starting from the cellular and
ending with the supranational.5 5 The systems are analyzed in terms
of their symbiotic and potential characteristics, and their variables,
which include environment, boundary, function, equilibrium, and
entropy.
Theorists who adher to the general systems framework56 hy53. Bertalanfy, GeneralSystem Theory, in GENERAL SYSTEMS YEARBOOK 11-10 (1956).
Other theorists in this school include J. David Singer, Alfred Kuhn, and Bruce Russett.
Gould and Barkun also subscribe to this school. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
54. GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24.
55. Miller, Living Systems- Basic Concepts, 10 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 193-237 (1965).

56. The only application of the general systems approach to international law can be
found in the Gould and Barkun volume, supra note 24. While this book is excellent, it is
essentially a guide to the general systems perspective and possible applications to international law.
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pothesize that similarity, or isomorphism, can be found across a
wide variety of social, biological, and physical systems. The quest
for these similarities can transmit knowledge across disciplines and,
in fact, integrate a wide variety of sciences.
The second use of the term systems analysis focuses on systems
of action and draws on the intellectual heritage of Malinowski's
structural functionalism and on the cybernetic models of Norbert
Weiner. 57 Kaplan and Katzenbach revealed their aspirations for
the approach when they stated that "[w]e hope such an approach
relates the norms of international law to their political foundations
from an illuminating theoretical perspective." 5 8 The approach specifies a system through a set of variables including actors, capabilities, information, essential rules, and transformation rules. The
specification of these variables provides a deductive system focusing on interaction between essential rules and transforming rules.
Kaplan derived six systems from various combinations of actors,
bloc actors, supranational actors, and nuclear capability. The two
systems to which he devoted most attention were the balance of
power and loose bipolar systems. In his work with Katzenbach,
Kaplan tried to indicate expected norms of international law as
premised on the political foundations of the essential rules of the
system.
The third use of the term systems analysis focuses on entities
and interactions However, the term system is used as an ordering
concept having the utility of being comprehensive and indicative of
international relationships, but without the specific theoretic content. Hoffmann, a critic of Kaplan's approach, sees the various configurations of a nation in history as systems or the "complex sets of
variables." 59 The variables in Hoffmann's system include actors, capabilities, objectives, and processes. These variables indicate
whether a system is stable, meaning limited, moderate, and consensual; or revolutionary, meaning intense, immoderate, and dissentaneous. The law is the dependent variable and three types of
57. B. MALINOWSKI, THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1945); N. WEINER, CYBERNETICS (1948). Theorists in this school include Gabriel Almond, Karl Deutsch, David
Easton, Talcott Parsons, and Morton A. Kaplan.
58. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v (1961). This volume is most frequently noted for its systems analysis. The
stress in this volume on rigorous deductive theory is not as pronounced as in Kaplan's work

published some four years earlier. M. KAPLAN,
POLITICS (1958).
59. Hoffmann, supra note 19, at 154.

SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
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law can be distinguished. They are the law of the political framework, the law of reciprocity, and the law of the community. 60 This
approach, termed "historical sociology," implies an extensive historical probing of social systems.
Thus, the conceptual order of the Model Two paradigm of international legal studies consists of: 1) demands for the reformulation of the approach to international law; 2) four assumptions
which markedly differ from the Model One viewpoint; and 3) two
elaborate conceptual frameworks which embody the assumptions.
B.

Methods of Analysis and Model Two

Methods of analysis employed by Model Two scholars are
somewhat more difficult to characterize than those employed by
Model One scholars. The Model Two scholars prefer to utilize a
particular set of methods and to seek a broader base of data, but the
methods and data actually utilized do not always measure up to the
preferred ideal. Yet, the types of methods and data to which Model
Two scholars aspire shall be discussed in order to present a full
picture of the paradigm.
The aspirations of the Model Two scholars regarding techniques of data manipulation essentially are those of the social sciences with a fairly strong stress on quantification. McDougal's
approach would demand at least an analysis of social science and
historical materials and explanations. With respect to data, the
Model Two scholars prefer the inclusion of substantive materials of
the social sciences and, in fact, this goal has been met to a substantial degree by some legal scholars. Falk, for example, has as many
footnotes in his scholarly works of historical and social science
materials as he does in his legal materials. Although Falk may be
exceptional in this respect, it is the goal of the Model Two paradigm to similarly broaden the base of legal scholarship. If the term
data is interpreted to mean systematically organized information
capable of quantitative manipulation, the verdict is split. Hoffmann
tends to view such manipulation as inappropriate and unrevealing
in the field of international law and finds the historical and sociological analyses to be the more appropriate tools. Nevertheless,
Hoffmann concedes that "so-called modern techniques" can be
utilized in those limited areas in which they are fruitful.6 Falk first
60. Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, in THE STRATEGY OF
WORLD ORDER 11 136-37 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1966).
61.

Hoffmann, supra note 19, at 151-52.
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indicated that legal subject matter could not be quantitative:
There is considerable reason to suppose that the data of international legal studies are not generally susceptible to quantification in any form that will not trivialize or distort inquiry.
International practice is not sufficiently iterative to permit the
aggregation of instances of recurrence. 62
He did demand, however, that information be related to theory
when he stated that "[t]he suggestion to seek empirical confirmation
does not imply an insistance upon quantification, although it does
63
stress the link between abstract concepts and observed behavior.
It appears that Falk later became a believer not only in quantified
data, but also in the whole scientific model:
The data of international legal studies are susceptible to manipulation by the newer techniques associated with modern statistical methods and computer analysis. It seems clear that future
work on international legal materials, especially the work of the
non-legally trained social scientists, will give increasing prominence to these "harder" techniques of data collection and analysis. A behavioral methodology assures the elimination of
rampart institutionalism and of covert moralism. .... 64
These data need to be collected and arranged in a systematic fashion to permit the formulation of well evidenced generalizations. In turn these generalizations can be formulated as
propositions about the relation of law and behavior which are
subject to validation and refutation. Only in this manner can international legal studies begin to acquire a scientific character
65

Gould and Barkun extend the statistical aspiration into a mathematical one, suggesting that "[t]here seems to be no good reason
why properly equipped scholars could not mathematize models of
international legal systems ....
While.the actual methods employed by the Model Two scholars have fallen short of their aspirations, they do reflect a wider
sweep than the sole use of legal materials as sources. They further
reflect a more orderly categorization and juxtaposition of information. The concept of science reflected in the Model Two paradigm
manifests a greater degree of rigor and coherence than that present
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Falk, supra note 9.
FALK, supra note 25, at 40.
Id. at 465.
Falk, supra note 9, at 368-69.
GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24, at 30.
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in Model One. Scholars under this approach view legal scholarship
as a distinct field of investigation to be studied through scholarly
technique rather than practice, which plays a minimal role in the
methodological skills of the Model Two scholar who may not be a
lawyer. By adopting explicit conceptual frameworks, the scholarly
work of Model Two is substantially free of the subjective evaluations and interpretations of Model One. Finally, the Model Two
stress on data, statistical manipulation, and verifying propositions
as a methodological goal increases the scientific warrant.
C

Strengths of the Model Two Approach

The strengths of Model Two depend upon whether or not one
is within the paradigm. The litany of Model Two's strengths is a
mirror image of the weaknesses of Model One. The strength's can
be summarized by stating that legal scholarship has ceased to be
irrelevant because Model Two's four assumptions placed their
scholars in touch with the political and legal reality of the world.
Falk notes that:
Attentiveness to the international context of international
law has also produced a livelier awareness of the relations between law and power in world affairs, thereby introducing realism and avoiding the inclination toward wishful thinking,
evident in earlier generations of internalegalism and moralism
67
tional scholars.
Model Two has also avoided detachment from policy through the
jurisprudential revolution of McDougal, whose work is directed at
policy analysis and policy advice. Detachment from the impact of
social variables on law has been reversed by the "ever closer association with the outlook, method and concerns of the social scientist. ' ' 68 Finally, the status of theory and method have been reversed
by adopting the systems and policy science frameworks. The impressionistic and normative weaknesses of method have been replaced by a concern for order, coherence, and quantitative rigor.
The development of an approach to law that challenged the
doctrine of consent, and replaced it with political variables that fostered the development of explicit, orderly, and empirical models,
and that encouraged the search for a scientific methodology, can be
roughly analogous to Kuhn's notion of a "paradigm shift." Such a
shift has occurred in international legal studies as the Model Two
67.
68.

Id. at 370.
Id.at 361.
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approach commanded the attention and allegiance of international
legal scholars. Kuhn states that the "[a]cquisition of a paradigm
and the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field." 69
D. Weaknesses of the Model Two Approach
The weaknesses of the Model Two paradigm of international
legal studies can be deciphered by looking closely at the two dominate conceptual frameworks of systems and policy analysis. This
will be followed by viewing some problems which cut across the
entire Model Two approach.
Systems analysis, as used by Hoffmann, carries no specific theoretical perspective. His use of the concept must be judged in terms
of the value of its insights and explanations the same as any other
historical or sociological explanation. Hoffmann's aspirations for
science can be seen as closer to Model One than Model Two.
Systems analysis as systems of entities, or general systems theory, tends to avoid most of the criticisms that are offered supra.
This approach, however, has not been applied sufficiently to international legal studies to produce a reliable indication of its potential strengths and weaknesses.
Systems analysis as systems of action has been applied to international law by Kaplan and Katzenbach. This approach is susceptible to a more relevant discussion. The approach has been
challenged both by philosophers of science, as incapable of theoretical explanation,7 ° and by political analysts for serious weaknesses
in its application to political science.7 ' While a full critique is beyond the scope of this article, some of the major issues can be
noted.
The definition of the system of action is mired in confusion.
The difficulties encountered when separating one system of action
from another, the system from its sub-systems, and the system from
its environment, weaken the approach. The levels of analysis of action within a system create further difficulties. Arbitrary differentiations of one system from a new system, and the inability to offer
dynamic explanations over substantial time periods, are two more
69. KUHN, supra note 2, at 11.
70. K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (1964); C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965).
71. Dowse, A Functionalist'sLogic, in WORLD POLITICS (1965); E. MEEHAN, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT: A CRITICAL STUDY (1967).
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conceptual difficulties.72
Another critical difficulty is the attribution of needs, goals, and
purposes to the systems or sub-systems. Theoretically, this leads to
treating that which is to be explained, as a given. Thus, the apof teleology, which imbues sub-systems
proach falls into the fallacy 73
with functions or purposes.
Finally, the approach tends to treat that which is an intellectual tool of order, as a reality. This fallacy of reification deems systems real or concrete when, in actuality, they are analytic or
conceptual. Meehan summarized "[s]ystems theory . . . [as] open
to serious methodological criticism. The concept of 'system' is highly ambiguous, as is the concept of function which is needed to clarify the operation of the system."' 74 Ernst Haas, in an attempt to
assess the utility of systems analysis, came up with a rather negative
evaluation and noted that "[it is equally dangerous to extend some
system theories from a field in which they proved useful into a new
area-the social sciences-in which they seem to apply only as metaphors.

' 75

Kaplan's approach to the use of systems analysis has been
challenged by scholars.7 6 Weltman finds Kaplan's analysis inconsistent, the rules tautological and contradictory, and the models incapable of generating testable propositions.7 7 The application of the
models to international legal analysis degenerated into a descriptive analysis of the norms associated with eighteenth and nineteenth century international relations, versus the norms of the post
World War II period. This analysis is not scientific, is often inaccurate, and provides no formal explanation. Referring to Kaplan's
book,78 Gould noted that "the political foundations of international
law are not exposed, and the theory, when not hampered by generalities minus evidence, sometimes even gets in the way."' 79 Systems
72.

J. SINGER,

A

GENERAL SYSTEMS TAXONOMY FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE 10-11

(1971).

73. Levy, Does it Matter ifHe's Naked Bawled the Child, in CONTENDING APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96 (J. Rosenau & K. Knorr eds. 1969); Haas, On Systems and
InternationalRegimes, 27 WORLD POL. 149 (1975).

74. Meehan, EmpiricalTheory. Explanationin the Social Sciences, in THE CONDUCT OF
POLITICAL INQUIRY 97 (L. Hayes & R. Hedlund eds. 1970).

75. Haas, On Systems and InternationalRegimes, 27 WORLD POL. 149 (1975).
76.

M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1957).

77. Weltman, Systems Theory in InternationalRelations. A Critique 4 Polity 301-29
(1972).
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Gould, Book Review, (M. KAPLAN, SYSTEMS AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS), LV AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 969 (1961).
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analysis, then, is not distinctive in an analytic sense under
Hoffmann, is no more than an interesting exhortation under Gould
and Barkun, and has serious theoretical and methodological difficulties under Kaplan.
The other conceptual approach commanding allegiance
among Model Two scholars is the policy science approach. Starting
with Lasswell, scholars have questioned the value of that approach
for the study of law. Yet the Lasswell framework has not proved its
superiority among political scientists if adherence to the framework
is an indication. The Lasswell apparatus suffers from overly rigid
and too many categories. Oran Young argues that the use of
Lasswell's model is not, in itself, sufficient to produce outstanding
legal scholarship and may hinder the development of formal theory. He argues further that the model alienates traditional legal
80
scholars while not adding to the study of international law.
McDougal's approach has also been criticized on the ground
that it is so complex and cumbersome that it is of little utility to
policy makers.8 " The general normative values of human dignity
and freedom are the main criteria in the McDougal approach. The
values appear, however, in a rather conventional western, liberal
package. Moreover, the difficulty of normative analysis of value
choices within the same hierarchy is glossed over. Finally,
McDougal's personal value judgments about legal questions seem
to flow out of a context of all Americanism as indicated by his position on nuclear testing, Vietnam, and the Cuban missile crisis. This
is important because the elasticity in his concept of legality allows
the introduction of personal interpretations of dignity. 2 Gidon
Gottlieb challenges McDougal's interpretations of rules, precedent
and other normative prescriptions. By viewing such rules as indicators of consensus, he charges that McDougal has emasculated the
guiding function of those rules, 3 resulting in the dissolution or
weakening of the line between legality and political expediency.
McDougal then offers reasonableness as a criteria, which leads to
80. Young, International Law and Social Science The Contributions of Myres S.
McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1972).
81. Stack, InternationalLaw and the Social Sciences, paper presented at International
Studies Convention (Feb. 21, 1975); FALK, supra note 25, at 10.
82. Young, supra note 80, at 72-73; Stack, InternationalLaw and the Social Sciences,
paper presented at International Studies Convention (Feb. 21, 1975).
83. Gottlieb, The Conceptual World ofthe Yale Law School, 21 WORLD POL. 108-22
(1968).
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equating reasonable with lawful.84
The point that legal or lawful can be equated with reasonable
leads to the question of the criteria of legality in the entire Model
Two approach. McDougal's identification of law with authority
and sanction means that in conflict ridden, pluralistic systems the
law becomes so fluid as to be undefinable. Thus, citizens, lawyers,
bureaucrats, judges, and policy makers are left without a criteria of
legality. "Although policy makers may not utilize such a concept of
legality, this is not a justification for making such concept so flexible that it disappears. McDougal's approach seems to note that
policy makers rarely use legal norms in guiding their critical decisions. Thus, his approach seems to have adopted the position that if
the policy makers won't come to us, we will go to them and redefine
law according to established authority, as well as redefine legality
according to existing sanctions. The elaborate framework to analyze decisions in a sociological context has not bridged the concepts
of law and policy simply by redefining them. Kunz notes that
"[slociological statements connecting facts with facts on the principle of causality state what is. Norms of law prescribe what ought to
1 9"86
be.
This particular weakness is not peculiar to McDougal. The
systems approach identifies law as an outcome of political interaction. Thus, the law becomes the rules of the system made explicit in
multilateral agreement or tacit norms of behavior. The fact that the
rules often are ill-defined and tacit does not aid legal judgment.
Moreover, such efforts tend to describe historical systems. When it
comes to the present, the definition of law becomes fluid when law
is a collection of tacit rules, partially specified agreements, and
emerging norms. The concept of legality tends to become ephemeral.
The problem of legal criteria is related directly to the problem
of dissolving the legal into the political. When legal concepts are no
longer distinct, the study of international law tends to dissolve into
everything else. McDougal's definition of law is no different than
the definition of policy making or political science.8 7 Falk is uneasy
about the problem of dissolving law into politics and states that:
84. Farer, supra note 9, at 440.
85. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioningof International Law, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann

eds. 1968).
86. Kunz, supra note 14, at 495.
87. Young, supra note 80, at 62.
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The task of legal analysis is to find a middle ground conjoining law to politics without collapsing the one into the other
and attaining a realism that neither expects law to guarantee a
peaceful world
nor concludes that law is irrelevant to interna88
tional peace.
Despite his recurring qualms, Falk has turned international
law into political interaction by embracing international law of behavior rather than for behavior. If McDougal turns law into policy
making, Falk turns it into political interaction by defining what
goes on between nations as a "horizontal legal order." Without the
Model One doctrine of consent, and with political variables controlling, the "horizontal legal order" at times becomes equal to international politics. Both McDougal and Falk define world order in
legal terms. In order to do so, they must stretch the term legal to
include a mass of complex interactions that basically are political in
nature. Young notes that:
There is some tendency among international lawyers to incorporate most political rules, social norms, habitual patterns of
behavior and so forth into the category of law. I cannot think of
any major conception of law which fully supports this tendency,
however,
and I think it is a serious source of conceptual confu89
sion.
Another criticism is directed at Model Two's demand that international legal studies move closer to social science concepts,
methods, and substantive materials. Although McDougal calls for a
bond between the social sciences and legal analysis, Young notes
that McDougal's
achievement of this objective is "not particularly
' 90
impressive.
Singer states that the use of the systems of action model of systems analysis creates problems. The search for data relevant to actions is quite difficult and the result is that there is "no data-based
research flowing from such models." 9 ' With respect to international
legal analysis, this leads to a somewhat conventional and loose descriptive relationship between Kaplan's systems and legal norms.
Furthermore, in order to engage in data-based research, analysts
fall into the scientific fallacy of abandoned models.92
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Falk, supra note 85, at 44.
Young, supra note 80, at 71.
Id. at 63.
SINGER, supra note 72, at 10.
Levy, supra note 73, at 103.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss2/8

28

Finnegan: Three Models of Science in the Study of International Law
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 8

Regarding methods of social science, the major thrust of the
Model Two scholars has been exhortation rather than application.
Consider, for example, Falk's use of international law as a "quasidependent" variable. While reflective of Falk's ambivalence toward
law as a dependent variable of the international system, and an independent variable for changing international politics, the term is
methodologically meaningless. What is a "quasi-dependent" variable? Is it a dependent variable at present that the researcher hopes
will become an independent variable in the future? If that is the
case, it is simply a dependent variable. Falk's hopes for the future
have nothing to do with testing a hypothesis. Is a "quasi-dependent" variable independent sometimes regarding diplomatic immunities? If that is the case, it is simply an independent variable; state
practice on diplomatic immunities is the dependent variable. Quasi,
in this case, seems to mean that Falk wishes the dependent variable
were something more important than diplomatic immunities. The
complete development of this weakness must wait for the discussion of the conceptual order of Model Three infra.
Regarding formal theory and method, the scholars of Model
Two are definitely pro-scientific, although they are somewhat unscientific in attitude. To be scientific, however, demands a conceptual order and method embodied in a more rigorous model of
science to which we now turn.
III.

MODEL THREE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A BRANCH OF

STUDY CONCERNED WITH THE SYSTEMATIC TESTING OF

HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM GENERALIZATIONS ORIGINALLY
ARRIVED AT THROUGH THE QUANTITATIVE
CLASSIFICATION OF OBSERVABLE FACT

The discussion of Model Three will first analyze what it means
to be scientific according to the above definition. Then, issues in the
Model Three conceptual order for international legal studies will
be discussed in light of that scientific definition, and in light of the
problems presented by Models One and Two.
A.

Conceptual Order and Model Three

Adopting a scientific model in the social sciences that demands
certain compliance is bound to provoke a reaction. Such demands
would stress an emphasis on explanatory empirical theory, a concern with recurring patterns rather than a single case, a concern
with operational concepts which have empirical referents, a conPublished by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978
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cern with the conceptual frameworks utilized, a concern for hypothesis testing with replicability, and a concern with the
techniques of precise data gathering, measurement, and presentation. The conflict between the pro-science and anti-science scholars
has been a phenomena common to every social science discipline.
Even a discipline such as economics, which seems to have the advantages of simplifying their assumptions, available data, and explanatory theory, has a disciplinary division between the
institutionalists and the econometricians. Sociology, psychology,
and political science have not escaped this dichotomy. In the field
of international relations, the question of science provoked a debate
which privoted around the issues of quantification, marginal research, models, values, reductionism, and the utility of traditional
research.9 3 Some of these issues will be discussed infra, although a
full delineation of the debate is beyond the scope of this article. It is
sufficient to note that a great number of scholars have accepted the
scientific approach, in the most vigorous sense of the word, as appropriate for the social sciences. The value of the scientific approach lies in the fact that it produces knowledge that is self
correcting. Thus, by its nature, such knowledge is not rooted in ignorance, folk wisdom, prejudice, or faith. Gould and Barkun have
noted that:
Science, as a way of thinking, can be set apart from every
day mental processes in at least two respects. First, like all genuinely creative activities, it centers upon the discernment of comSecond,
mon properties in outwardly diverse phenomena ....
its
and,
indeed,
it depends upon making all of its assumptions
94
prejudices both conscious and explicit.
Model Three science can be discussed best in terms of explanation,
theory, and normative valuation.
George Homans indicates that the two tasks of science are discovery and explanation.9 5 Discovery, as shall be discussed more
fully infra, is the process of data collection and hypothesis testing.
Explanation, however, is central to the heart of scientific analysis,
and Homans believes that lack of explanation is the central problem of the social sciences.
93. Finnegan, InternationalRelations.- The Disputed Search for Method 34 REv. OF
POL. 40-66 (1972).
94. GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24, at 47.
95. G. HOMANs, THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1967).
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Explanation is not definition; definition precedes both explanation and theory. Thus, the definition of "role" as the behavior
expected of a person in a social position is not an explanation. Yet,
we would need such a definition if we were to use "role" in an
explanation. Explanation is not "orienting statements" either.
These statements are more than a definition and consist of large
aggregations of variables in the form of a proposition.96 Examples
of orienting statements would be Marx's proposition about the ability of the means of production to determine the other features of a
society; or the Model Two systems analysis proposition that the legal system is a product of the political, economic, and social relationships within the international system. Unlike explanations,
these are conceptual frameworks that look at variables only in relationship to other variables, which leaves the direction of the relationship extremely general.97 A third type of explanation consists of
successive restatements of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar
until the mind is satisfied. 98 Such an explanation is insufficient in a
rigorous definition of science; however, it does have great value in
generating insights into the obscure isomorphism within the logical
structures of natural phenomena. This type of explanation also has
great value in teaching when analogy and metaphor are the tools of
transmitting the unfamiliar into the familiar. The weakness of this
type of explanation is that the acceptance of the restatement depends upon the psychological acceptability of the explanation
rather than its soundness. Because of wide variations in the psychological receptivity of different people, this type of explanation is left
without an objective standard for assessing the soundness of the
explanation.9 9
Having rejected the definition, orienting statements, and restatement models of explanation as inadequate, we can turn to the
nomological model. Referring to this model, Meehan indicates that
"[s]tructurally an explanation consists of a set of symbols or variables, a set of rules that relate those symbols to empirical observations, and a closed logical structure or calculus for manipulating
the symbols."'"
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 13.
98. A. ISAAK, SCOPE AND METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 110-11 (1975); Weaver,
Explanation and Scientffc Investigation, in THE CONDUCT OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 81-86 (L.
Hayes & R. Hedlund eds. 1970).
99. ISAAK, supra note 98, at 111-12.

100. Meehan, supra note 74, at 63.
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This model of explanation has four features that need clarification. First, an explanation is not complete and graven in stone. All
explanations, in a sense, are indeterminate and subject to further
explanation. One of the tasks of science is to search for more general explanations which can account for a wider range of phenomena. Second, the structure of an explanation is treated as if it were a
perfect isomorph for an empirical situation. However, because it
can never achieve that degree of congruence, it requires the ceteris
paribus assumption." ° ' The assumption that other conditions will
remain equal in impact is not peculiar to social science and also is
operative in the physical sciences. Third, while the scientific
method provides a link between the variables and the empirical
world, the propositions must be confirmed by empirical evidence if
an explanation is to be strong or true. This requirement concerns
the propositions rather than the structure of the deductive logic.
Finally, the propositions which the social sciences generate are
statements of central tendency and are statistical. Thus, the explanations used are statistical-probabilistic." 2 The nature of the statistical-probabilistic explanation is that, unlike the deductive
explanation, the explication is not necessarily true for a single case.
Logically, the deductive necessity holds, but' because the propositions are statements of probability the explanation is a probabilistic
statement. If we use the generalization that seventy-five percent of
the voting blacks in the United States vote democratic, the initial
condition is the existence of a particular black American who votes.
The explanation that this particular American votes democratic is
false. Yet, the explanation that it is three to one that this particular
American votes democratic, is true. Homans contends that in social
science our propositions are not general; that they hold only in narrow, spatial, or temporal limits; and that they are probabilistic
10 3
rather than universal.
It has been argued that in international legal studies there is an
abundance of definitions, orienting statements, and restatements,
but that nomological explanations are either implicit or nonexistent. When identified, the explanations often are based on propositions devoid of evidence or verification. Most of what is offered as
explanation in international legal studies is descriptive or intuitive
inference. When probed from this perspective, systems analysis and
101. Id. at 65.
102. ISAAK, supra note 98, at 109.
103. HOMANS, supra note 95, at 20.
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policy analysis are predominantly "orienting statements." The specific behavior of a nation, decision maker, or international organization is constantly accounted for with an enthymemic explanation.
Such an explanation lacks a covering law or general proposition
that has been empirically verified for all behaviors of the genre
under discussion. If one reconstructs the unspecified general proposition, it is often illogical, and either unverified or unverifiable.
Fisher's interesting article offers several reasons why governments might consider the observance of a rule.l°4 The first question
is what Fisher means by government. It appears that he has an aggregation problem because obedience to international law can occur in a series of arenas, such as state and federal courts,
bureaucratic agencies, and those decision making positions within
the executive branch. Fisher states that governments must consider
external reactions of other states, their opponents in the dispute,
and their own public; that governments have an interest in settling
all disputes justly and that this interest overrides immediate interests; and that governments undermine their own authority and rule
05
oriented bureaucracies by commanding disobedience to the law. 1
He further states that because governments do respond to these
pressures, they behave legally. He fails, however, to state which
reason prevails with respect to what class of cases and under what
conditions. Thus, Fisher's observations are a set of interesting independent variables cutting across various levels. For example,
Fisher indicates that governments must take public opinion into
consideration. Does government mean the legislature, the foreign
office, or the executive advisors? While this is an interesting hypothesis, it requires the specification of public opinion and the type
of legal behavior it changes.
One other interesting point is that bureaucracies internalize
rule observance which becomes routine. Thus, to command behavior against that rule is disruptive. Yet, it appears that this is not
always the case. We must know what class of legal behavior is regularly presented and by what bureaucracies. More importantly, we
must know what jolts bureaucratic government out of their routine
response of first gear and into the overdrive of Hoffmann's "high
politics." When observers noted missile emplacements in Cuba,
why did they not inform the legal advisor of the State Department
104. Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Gopernments, in
35-44 (R. Falk & W. Hanreider eds. 1968).
105. Id. at 39-43.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OR-

GANIZATION
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for a routine cable of protest? What are the thresholds? Fisher
asserts what he is attempting to explain, which renders his observations weak regarding explanations, definitions, precision, and documentation.
Explanations can be seen as theories because the crucial function of theory is to explain. Those explanations that incorporate a
wide diversity of behavior under covering law are theories, but
more often theories are clusters of explanations. This is so because
theory consists of logically related general propositions that are integrated into networks of explanation. In order to explore this notion of theory, it is necessary to examine what theory is not. The
term has a multiplicity of meanings; a wide variety of intellectual
operations are labeled theory. By accepting this approach, we
would be unable to decide when we had a theory, because, by definition, we would have to accept a plethora of theories. The other
approach is to reserve the word theory for a specific intellectual
apparatus and utilize other terms for other intellectual tools.
Meehan has pointed out four important intellectual tools
which are not theories. They are, in fact, pre-theoretical aids to intellectual order. He first notes that a series of nominal definitions is
not a theory. With explanation, definition is required but insufficient. Theory is similar in that a series of definitions are needed, but
insufficient. In order to explain, a definitional system such as "game
theory" must be related to observable data through a set of rules 1of6
correspondence; otherwise it is incapable of explaining anything. 0
A comprehensive list of potential factors which may influence
the outcome of the behavior we seek to explain is not a theory.
Such a list is, at best, a taxonomy. At worst it is an indiscriminate
list that offers no guidance as to important variables, no guidance
as to the direction or strength of relationships, and no general orientation toward the topic. Young notes that Lasswell's framework
tends to hinder the development of theory severely by introducing excessive numbers of potentially relevant factors while the
crucial problem in developing viable formal theories is to construct simple logical models by stripping away as many factors as
the predictive accuracy of the repossible without undermining
7
sultant propositions. 0o
McDougal's framework is not the only one to fall prey to this problem. Sheikh and Falk are prone to listing events that have hap106. Meehan, supra note 74, at 96-97.
107.

Young, supra note 71, at 68-69.
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pened in the international sphere, such as the multiplication of
actors, new supranational actors, new multicultural influences, and
threats of nuclear warfare. Some, all or none of these factors may
have something to do with international law and international legal
behavior. What is assumed is what is to be explained. The listing is
not very helpful until the elements of the list can be shown, individually or collectively, to have changed some behavior and why. Although common sense indicates that such factors will probably
make a difference or seem to0 8influence actions, it must be demonstrated rather than asserted.'
The use of a model is not a theory, but it comes quite close. A
model is an isomorphic reconstruction of the reality to be explained
that is always simplified. Standing between the complexity of reality and the simplicity of nomological explanations, it is a guide or
tool for linking general propositions to the empirical world. In
Homans' terms, a model would be a fairly elaborate set of definitions and orienting statements, but not a theory. The last intellectual tool which is not a theory, is an approach. Systems theory, field
theory, and power theory are all approaches that identify the cento be manipulated and the general organization of intral concepts
09
formation. 1
Most of the research in international legal studies in Model
One and Model Two fall into the above categories. The onus of
criticism falls more on Model Two scholarship because Model One
scholars never demanded such rigor from their paradigmatic definitions of science, theory, approach, or method.
What is theory if not models or definitions? Theory in Model
Three is a deductively related system of general propositions that
are based on a set of axiomatic definitions. These propositions have
empirical referents and describe, explain, and predict behavior.
Based on this definition, there are few works in international legal
studies which can be called theory. The two frameworks discussed
supra, systems and policy analysis, do not meet Corbett's demand
placed upon legal studies over twenty years ago, because they cannot explain nor predict. McDougal not only does not explain legal
behavior, but he also assumes that political considerations are paramount over legal; he redefines legal to be political; and he offers
policy advice that is unlikely to be influential either politically or
108. SHEIKHl, supra note 33, at 23-45; Falk, supra note 9, at 357-58; Falk, supra note 21,

at 90.
109. Meehan, supra note 94, at 96-98.
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legally. McDougal's approach meets only the criteria of description. Systems analysis fares no better by meeting only the criteria of
rather generalized historical description. The system of entities of
the general systems theory approach avoids some of the difficulties
discussed supra, and professes to be fairly theory free. This means it
is only an approach and pretends to be no more. This approach is
hospitable to explanations in terms of general propositions
that are
0
verified from data collected in the framework."
By demanding explicit explanation and theory grounded in
empirical data, we ignore a fundamental quality of international
legal studies. That quality is found in the fact that the subject matter is normative in its intent and quality. Model Two scholars have
become so concerned with restructuring the study of international
law that the legal or normative elements were dissolved into the
political and empirical. Law becomes what nations do and legality
becomes so fluid as to disappear. Falk reflects this tension when, in
the midst of his exhortations to be scientific and empirical, he continually returns to the need for international value standards. He
urges the establishment of value standards for order, fairness, and
restraint. He further states that "[t]his is admittedly a daring and
dangerous view, quite at odds with certain prevalent notions of scientific detachment as it premises an invidious comparison of various theories of international law upon a system oriented judgment
as to which theory is likely to advance overall needs." I I" Falk's belief that his view is "daring and dangerous" is based upon a misunderstanding of the role of values in scientific analysis.
An adequate discussion of values in scientific analysis requires
an extensive treatment, and this article allows the discussion of only
a few key points. First, unlike the natural-law school of thought,
Model Three science cannot state in absolute terms whether the
value goals people pursue are good or bad, right or wrong, and just
or unjust. Nor can Model Three science state which is the most
valuable among several conflicting value goals." 2 The difficulty
arises from the logical impossibility of deriving "ought" conclusions from premises concerned with empirical description or explanation.
The second point about Model Three science concerns the values of the researcher. The scientific method renders the researcher's
110. SINGER, supra note 72, at 15.
111. Falk, supra note 85, at 141.
112. A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY 124 (1959).
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explanation intersubjectively transmissible. This is also true of the
data and data manipulation. Thus, research becomes replicable by
another researcher who may have a personal value preference different from the original scholar. If the logic of the explanation and
the data meet this standard, then different value preferences do not
interfere with an accurate explanation of phenomena. The researcher does not cease to have values. In fact, he has exercised
personal value choices in two respects; the choice of the scientific
approach is a decision that indicates such an approach is more valuable than others; and the subject matter choice is a decision that
some areas are worth more study than others.
There are several factors within the context of the scientific
method that affect the examination of values. What values are people pursuing at a particular time and place, how are they defined,
and where did they originate? These are some of the pertinent questions that must be asked. One must further consider the suitability
of various means to achieve stated values, the choice of means, and
13
the consequences and risks of means to achieve stated values.'
Even an absolute value can be introduced into scientific research as
a working hypothesis if it is recognized as an assumption.
Falk seeks to posit value goals for the entire planet and then
examine the degree to which they presently exist, how they could be
realized, and at what cost. The consequences would be in terms of
the values of particular groups, national decision makers, and international power brokers." 4 While this approach is acceptable, the
scientific approach would posit values as working assumptions and
not offer them as self-evident, absolute values. Falk mistakenly
states that the researcher must be a moral eunuch who is scientifically detached. He feels that he is challenging some prevalent notions by indicating that the normative dimension must be
considered in international legal studies.
The final point to be considered is the question of normative
evaluation which arises when international legal scholars engage in
value judgments having the quality of preference between absolute
values rather than instrumental values. Turning from the scientific
method to the realm of philosophical justification, it is worth noting
that normative evaluation is often lacking even within a posited
value system, such as McDougal's. McDougal offers human dignity
113. Id. at 121-22.
114. Falk, A New ParadigmforInternationalLegal Studies, 84 YALE L. J. 969-1021
(1975).
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as an overarching, normative, and absolute value, the components
of which are: maximum production of values, maximum sharing of
values, and participation in the distribution of values.
The four components of normative judgments noted by
Meehan are: 1)a set of phenomena; 2) a set of assumptions regarding the consequences of choices involving the set of phenomena; 3)
the normative judgment; and 4) the justification for the normative
judgment. Each of these components shall be evaluated to some
degree. The first can be evaluated by the scientific method standards of accurate description, definition, and empirical links between
concepts. A judgment could then be challenged on the ground that
the presentation of the phenomena under discussion was so inaccurate that it rendered component numbers two, three, and four invalid. The second component can be judged by the technical
evaluation approach discussed supra. A technical evaluation is
merely a prediction based upon a nomological explanation. The
normative or ethical judgment of component number three is
closely tied to the fourth component of justification. Additionally,
the deductive logic which allows the analysis of empirical explanation can be used if the "ought" premises are substituted for "is"
premises. The logic of a judgment can be traced back to first principles where standards derivable from scientific method are not apparent. Yet, the chain of the logic or illogic of a justification can be
analyzed at this point. 1 5 Again, under the McDougal approach,
difficulty is encountered when the values within the hierarchy are
not examined in terms of the conflicts between them. The logic of
such value judgments can lead to an emotivist basis of personal
experience."'
B. Methods of Analysis and Model Three
Model Three's notion of science in terms of explanation, theory, and values have been discussed. Consistent with the demand
for empirical generalizations and theory is the concomitant demand
for empirical methods of analysis. Wolfram Hanreider notes that
"[c]learly a change of paradigm must in the long run lead to a
change in method. Equally compelling is the consideration that a
' 7
change in method can lead to a change of paradigm." "1
115. Meehan, supra note 74, at 37-48.
116. Young, supra note 80, at 73.
117.

W. HANREIDER, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A THEO-

RETICAL INTRODUCTION 22 (1971).
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The method that corresponds to the Model Three paradigm is
the scientific method. The scientific method, however, is the artificial creation of textbooks and philosophers of science. The reasoning within the scientist's mind is termed "logic in use" by Abraham
Kaplan." ' This reasoning can be circular, linear, inconsistent, incorrect, synthetic, or analytic as the scientist attempts to solve the
question at hand. The "logic in use" among scientists is so diverse
that it has been suggested that the scientific method consists of no
more than doing one's damnedest. However, when the scientist
presents the results of research to others, the logic of his explanation must be made explicit. Moreover, the data and techniques of
data manipulation must meet the criteria of intersubjective transmissability and replicabihty. Kaplan refers to this consistency in
the logic of explanation as reconstructed logic.' Thus, the scientific method model is a "reconstructed logic" emanating from the
work of scientists. We can use the model to discuss the problems of
scientific research, but this in no way compels such an order in reasoning of any scientific investigation.
As indicated below, the process can be seen as a ladder running from the abstract to the concrete.

118. A. KAPLAN,
119. Id.

THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY
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The most abstract level is the interrelated propositions of a theory
which generates problems to be explained. In lieu of theory, conceptual frameworks or models may be utilized to generate hypotheses.
To test a theory requires as much evidence as can be marshalled. The need is for systematic evidence rather than idiosyncratic examples or instances. Thus, quantification of variables
becomes imperative, for without such quantification we have no
science at all. Singer asserts that120measurement and quantification
are "a sine qua non of science."'
Recognizing that application of Model Three science is difficult, Sheikh appropriately warns:
On the methodological level as above there are difficulties
.. of building analytic and functional models and conceptual
framework [sic] with the help of pertinent variables that can be
meaningfully related and operationally specified in appropriate
categories to broaden our understanding of law-politics relationship [sic] in a variety of contexts. Also, there is the problem of
120. SINGER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 7 (1965).
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data collection. The validity and reliability of data may not be
easy to attain because of the nature of the subject, yet data collection is necessary to test these models and develop more specific testable hypotheses.' 2 '
Nevertheless, the scientific method remains as a link between theory and data, the abstract and concrete, and insight and evidence. It
is the tool that creates scientific theory according to the demands of
the Model Three paradigm.
C. Model Three's Approaches to InternationalLaw
International legal studies are at a point where the pressures
for a more vigorous concept of science lead to several dilemmas. In
part, the dilemmas are what Abraham Kaplan calls the "paradox of
conceptualization" and can be represented by the following diagram. 122

THEORY

DATA (

) CONCEPTS

The first dilemma is that theory will not develop without accurate and important concepts and data-based propositions. The second dilemma is that the choice of concepts, and the development of
data generating indicators, cannot be accomplished without the
guidance of theory. Finally, without well-defined concepts and theoretical direction, data collection will be indiscriminate and lack
validity as well as reliability.
When a discipline is at this point it is probably best to proceed
on all fronts so as to allow the testing of one element against another, refining, discarding, accepting in a dialectical process. Gould
and Barkun note that:
There is within the social sciences a kind of tacit agreement
to keep open as many roads of inquiry as possible, a feeling that
this is not the time to close off options. This pragmatic orientation requires the multiplication of methods, theories, and problem formulations, with the hope that out of this competitive
121. SHEIKH!, supra note 33, at 340.
122. KAPLAN, supra note 118, at 53.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978

41

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1978], Art. 8
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

situation certain roads will emerge as superior to others. 23
International lgal studies need this theoretical and methodological
Darwinism to move beyond the dilemmas discussed supra.
In order to avoid a number of pitfalls, the development of
models and hypotheses under Model Three's approach must address the questions considered below.
1) Definition. The definitional problem must be addressed in
international legal studies. The assumptions and perspectives of
Model One and Model Two have various strengths and weaknesses. Yet, Model One scholars have the edge because they can
define the international law and consequently determine legality.
The Model Two approach is acceptable if one is willing to define
away, at least to some extent, the normative and distinctive quality
of law. To meet this particular requirement, while avoiding the pitfalls of Model One assumptions, is not an easy task. The strengths
of Model Two assumptions are in the juxtaposition of law with political variables in the context of decision making. There can be no
retreat from the value of that perspective. It becomes necessary
then not only to rescue law from the Model Two definition, but also
from the unreality of Model One assumptions regarding community, control, and consent.
2) Level ofAnalysis. The level of analysis in international legal
scholarship must be broadened in order to focus on individuals,
organizations, groups, nations, regions, blocs, and the entire international system. Falk has urged this broadened purview. Yet,
Model One's principal level is the nation, and the two main levels
of emphasis in Model Two are Kaplan's system and McDougal's
policy maker. Hypotheses pertaining to individuals and international law are rare. The impact of international law on collective
attitudes and public opinion is often assumed, but rarely studied.
3) Dependent and Independent Variables. The Model One assumption that international law is an independent variable controlling political behavior is as restrictive as Model Two's assumption.
Model Two assumes that political variables are independent while
international law is a dependent variable. In their attempts to rescue international legal studies from the unreality of Model One, the
Model Two scholars rushed into a self-made trap. In fact, any a
prioridefinition that determines which set of variables is independent is a conceptual trap.'2 4 In specific hypotheses, international
123. GOULD & BARKUN, supra note 24, at 15.
124. HANREIDER, supra note 117, at 19.
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law may be the independent variable and verifiable by empirical
observation. In other hypotheses, law would be dependent because
it is a communication which portrays prior political conditions. The
determination should be empirical testing for the purpose of finding the threshold where legal considerations defer to political considerations. We can indicate the problem with the following
diagram.
STATE BEHAVIOR
Time 1 2...

N

LAW CONROLLED
POLITICAL SUBORDINATE

LOW

POLITICALLY CONTROLLED
LAW SUBORDINATE
HIGH
REACTION TO THREAT OR
INITIATION OF ACTION

LOW
VALUE
HIGH

A certain class of state behavior is regularly controlled by law, with
politics subordinated. Such is the case in diplomatic privileges and
in immunities or citizenship questions. Another type of state behavior is controlled by politics, and in these cases international law is
subordinate. This would occur when national security issues are at
stake. When the threat to the state's interest is high, or if the state
initiates a policy to preserve its interests, one could hypothesize that
political considerations would control. Hence, the pressure rises to
determine the outcome in a unilateral and violent manner. Conversely, when the threat is low and the state's interest is relatively
insignificant, one could hypothesize that legal considerations would
control. The state, then, would be amenable to a determination by
law or an external agency, such as a foreign, regional, or international body.
The crucial point is that the line separating these two classes of
behavior is, itself, variable. Moreover, various combinations of response-initiation exist and can be recombined with other variables.
Such other variables might be: the opponent's combination of
threat and value; who the opponent is in the particular threat-value
situation (a traditional enemy may be viewed as more threatening
than a traditional ally); the actor's habitual responses to this class of
threats to these particular values (nations vary regarding regular
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habits of law-controlled behavior versus politics-controlled behavior); and finally, the respective military capabilities of the actors (a
weak nation in conflict with a powerful nation may seek a lawcontrolled resolution rather than risk military defeat). If the line
between law-controlled behavior and politically-controlled behavior is empirically known, and the conditions which cause variations can be specified, the reality of international law in state
behavior can be eventually determined. This can be accomplished
without contrived "consent" or a redefinition of international law.
4) Dynamic Models. The approach toward law utilized in
Model One is quite static. Its strength is that the law can often be
specified; however, this means that a change in the law is more
difficult to specify. The "why" of change is an analytical weakness
under Model One. While Model Two scholars advocate identification of variables and quantitative analysis, they often do not indicate the time frame of the variables examined, although Falk is an
exception to this charge. The type of explanation sought in Model
Three would be dynamic as well as spatial. Dynamic explanations
indicate changes in dependent variables from changes in independent variables located in a prior time period. The time difference
can vary, but it must be significant enough to explain change rather
than merely account for contemporaneous variation.
The four points delineated above-definition, level of analysis,
dependent and independent variables, and dynamic models-are
but a few of the difficult conceptual and methodological difficulties
facing international legal studies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the direction and thrust of Model Three' 2 5 has been
set by Model Two scholars, its promise has yet to be realized. The
study of international law is locked in a gray area between paradigms. Kuhn notes that "[t]hroughout the pre-paradigm period
125. Readers interested in empirical approaches to the study of international law may
further consult Coplin, The World Court in the InternationalBargaining Process, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND ITS FUNCTIONS 317 (R. Gregg & M. Barkun eds. 1968); Coplin &
Rochester, The Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, The InternationalCourt of Justice
and the United Nations. A Comparative Empirical Survey, 66.AM. POLITICAL Sci. REV. 529
(1972); and Friedheim, FactorAnalysisas a Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW
OF THE SEA 47 (L. Alexander ed. 1967). Those interested in empirical approaches to the
study of international relations and foreign policy may refer generally to J. ROSENAN, THE
SCIENTIC STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

(1971);

ed. 1974); and C.
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when there is a multiplicity of competing schools, evidence of progress, except within schools, is very hard to find . . . .This is the
period. . . during which individuals practice science, but in which
the results of their enterprise do not add up to science as we know
it." ,26 Through perseverance we can eventually refine and integrate
the conceptual and taxonomic efforts of such scholars as Falk,
McDougal, Gould, and Barkun into theory under Model Three's
definition. The pioneering, quantitative efforts of such scholars as
Rohn and Friedheim also could be integrated into Model Three's
approach.
A discipline that incorporates knowledge based on science is
stronger than one based solely on Model One or Two. Science, as a
form of knowledge, is objective, self correcting, and productive for
policy. A scientific approach would complement and enrich the jurisprudential theory of Model One and increase the rigor of Model
Two. Without the foundations of Model One and Two, however,
Model Three could not exist. In the last analysis, international legal
studies must retain a methodological pluralism in order to avoid
the folly of ignoring insights that come from different approaches.
Certainly, as an approach to scholarship science has its strength,
but humanistic insight has qualities as well. Insight and evidence is
needed in both the normative and empirical sphere. This world,
which seems bent on destroying itself, features a desperate race between wisdom and ignorance. Hence, any knowledge which aids in
our survival is of incalculable value.

126. KUHN, supra note 2, at 162.
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